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STOP AND FRISK: "SAY IT LIKE IT IS"
EVELLE.J. YOUNGER
The author is District Attorney of Los Angeles County, California. He is a former judge of the
Superior Court of Los Angeles County.
In this article District Attorney Younger presents a penetrating analysis of the social and constitu-
tional issues involved in the police investigative procedure of "stop and frisk".
Out of the dialogue currently being waged con-
cerning powers and limitations in relation to police
activity, there has emerged one concept which I
believe should have the support of both schools of
thought-the law enforcement oriented individual
as well as the civil libertarian.
I support the basic concept1 of the American
Law Institute's so-called "stop and frisk" proposa5
as the practical solution to some problems of law
enforcement as well as an advantage to some
innocent citizens in their dealings with the police.
"Say it like it is." This admonition, frequently
used by teenagers, suggests that the younger gen-:
eration questions our ability to describe things as
they are rather than as we think they are or as
they should be. The mote articles I read relating
to "stop and frisk" the more I am inclined to agree
with the teenagers.
Every night in many cities throughout our land
a police officer will have the following experience,
with variations:
At 2:00 a.m. a man will attempt to hold up a
filling station, grapple with and fatally shoot one
of two attendants, lose his revolver'in the struggle,
run to an automobile parked nearby, and take off
alone in %;hat he second filling station attendant
describes as a light Chevrolet coupe, 1964 or 1965
vintage. The gunman will be described as a
young Caucasian wearing a dark hat. This much
will go over the police radio and all units will be
alerted. Five minutes later, two miles away from
the filling station a police car responding to the call
and heading toward the station will pass a light
1964 Chevrolet coupe going in the opposite direc-
I While I support the basic concept of the ALw pro-
posal, I am not in accord with .the text of all its provi-
sions. For example, I submit that an arbitary time limit
of twenty minutes is unrealistic. I favor the approach of
the California courts in applying a test of reasonablefiess
to each fact situation.
2 ALI IODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGMENT PRO-
CEDURE § 2.02. The proposal appears'in the appendix
to this paper, p. 300.
tion at a legal speed. The driver vill be a Caucasian
in a dark hat, in his middle or late twenties. The
police car will make an abrupt u-turn and stop the
Chevrolet. The officer will approach and talk to the
driver. The driver will show a driver's license iden-
tifying him as a resident of a town two hundred
miles away in the same state. The car registration
will be in his name. He will explain that he has been
visiting friends and is on his way home. The offi-
cer will explain that there has just been a holdup-
murder a few miles away; that the stopped car and
driver match generally the description given by a
witness; that the witness is just a few moments
away; that the officer admits there is nothing un-
usual about a Caucasian'in a dark hat driving a
light 1964 Chevrolet coupe down a street at two
o'clock in the morning, and, in all probability, that
the man stopped is completely innocent of any in-
volvement. However, the officer will say that in
view of the seriousness of the offense and the re-
mote possibility that the driver was involved, the
driver is requested to wait for five to ten minutes
while a radio call is made and the witness brought
over for possible identification.
The officer would presumably coritendt'that he
has made the foregoing explanation in a polite and
-friendly manner. From the driver's viewpoint, the
officer presumably appeared rude and officious. In
any event, the driver will refuse to cooperate and
will say, in effect, "Arrest me or get out of my way."
"This reaction is certainly consistent with guilt.
Unfortunately, the reaction is also consistent with
innocence. Many people under these circumstances
will refuse to cooperate. Possibly the driver re-
ceived a traffic ticket a few weeks earlier and was
still mad. Maybe he believes, along with some
students of the law, that we dare not yield an inch
to police authority-that to do so is to give a mile.
The officer, in the absence of any "stop and
frisk" authority, can either arrest the driver on
suspicion of robbery-murder or release him. It is
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too bad there are no other alternatives. It is too bad
the driver does not cooperate. It is too bad that
the officer could not find some suspicious circum-
stances which clearly gave him authority to arrest
without a warrant. It is too bad that the driver
did not turn out to be a well-known local citizen
who could always be located later if necessary.
It would be a shame to arrest an innocent man for
robbery-murder and leave him permanently
scarred with a very serious arrest record (even
though he is released two hours later, after being
mugged and printed, when the witness comes to the
station, looks at him and says, "He is not the
man."). It also would be a terrible thing to let him
go if, in fact, he was the robber-murderer.
This article is designed to give certain practical
reasons why reasonable persons, not unduly bur-
dened by suspicions of or animosity toward po-
licemen, should support the concept of "stop and
frisk." It also seeks to provide a sound legal argu-
ment for the constitutional acceptance of "stop and
frisk."
To establish a frame of reference, I undertake
here to list a set of facts or premises which I believe
to be uncontroverted:
1. The stopping of persons on the street for ques-
tioning and investigation has for some time been a
recognized police practice.
2. The questioning of persons on the street under
suspicious circumstances is a valuable police tech-
nique and has contributed to the prevention and
solution of crime.
3. The impact of Mapp v. Ohio3 and the exclu-
sionary rule have created some confusion and
question concerning the validity of this technique.
4. Police patrol units in metropolitan cities are
designed to prevent crime as well as to solve crime,
and they necessarily operate differently than the
units which perform follow-up investigation.
5. There are many persons validly arrested and
booked who are in fact innocent and whose inno-
cence is established by follow-up investigation.
6. Most policemen are conscientious, honest and
interested in effectively preventing and solving
crime and protecting the public, and these "good"
policemen are not interested in arresting or har-
assing citizens gimply for the sake of harassment.
7. There are some policemen now who do harass
or arrest persons simply for the sake of harass-
ment.
8. In this country crime is increasing at a sub-
3 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
stantial, if not alarming, rate and it is important
that we do all that we reasonably and constitu-
tionally can to improve the efficiency of our law
enforcement agencies.
In California police officers have been given
substantially the same "stop and frisk" authority
by appellate court decisions as would be granted
legislatively in those states adopting the ALl pro-
posals. The decisional law of the State of California
authorizes some compulsory detention police pro-
cedures. The following is a capsule statement of the
California law:
4
A police officer may detain and question a person
when the circumstances are such as would indicate
to a reasonable man in like position that such a
course of conduct is necessary to the proper dis-
charge of his duties. This includes stopping pedes-
trians or motorists on the streets for questioning.
Temporary detention for questioning permits
reasonable investigation without necessarily mak-
ing an arrest. There must be reasonable grounds to
justify the officer to detain and question. In the
absence of such reasonable grounds for detention
(which may fall short of probable cause to make an
arrest) any evidence obtained incidental to the
unlawful detention is inadmissible. Where the cir-
cumstances warrant it, officers may request a sus-
pect to alight from a car for questioning or to
submit to a superficial search for concealed weap-
ons. In the event of a recently reported crime in
the neighborhood, the police officer may take a
reasonably detained suspect to the scene of the
crime for further investigation.5 In light of our
experience both in the field and in the courts, we
can discuss this subject, hopefully, both objec-
tively and with some degree of expertise.
The problem concerning "stop and frisk" can be
simply stated as follows:
If an officer observes a person on the street under
circumstances which would indicate to a reason-
4 Numerous California cases deal with various aspects
of the right to stop, detain and conduct a cursory search
for weapons. The following cases are representative:
People v. One 1960 Cadillac Coupe, 62 Cal.2d 92, 396
P.2d 706 (1964); People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal.2d 448,
380 P.2d 658 (1963); People v. Hanamoto 44 Cal. Rptr.
153 (1965); People v. Koelzer, 34 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1963);
Hood v. Superior Court. 33 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1963);
People v. Gibson, 33 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1963).
5 People v. Parham, 60 Cal.2d 378, 384 P.2d 1001
(1963); People v. Hanamoto and People v. Koelzer,
supra note 4. It would appear that the police under ap-
propriate circumstances could take a person to the scene
of a crime without arresting him and even without his




able man (with the training and expertise of the
officer) that investigation is indicated, shall the
officer have the power to stop that person, detain
him for questioning and, if necessary as a protec-
tion, conduct a cursory search for weapons?
If, as a result of such stopping and questioning,
the officer develops facts which constitute prob-
able cause justifying an arrest and search, should
any evidence which this full-blown search dis-
closes be ruled inadmissible if the facts which
prompted the initial stopping did not themselves
rise to the dignity of probable cause for an -arrest,
although they were sufficient, in the mind of a rea-
sonable man, to constitute probable cause for the
initial stopping?
Those who believe that police conduct should
always be severely limited contend that the officer
in the above situation should have two alterna-
tives:
1. To simply ignore the individual and take no
action; or,
2. Arrest him if there is probable cause existing
to support such arrest.
They argue that the third alternative of per-
mitting a limited stopping, detaining and frisking
would lead to abuse and harassment. I believe it
would have just the reverse effect.
To afford the police this third alternative would
result in the release without booking of many
persons who might otherwise be arrested.
The officer who would harass and abuse is doing
so now; the conscientious officer is not. If a police-
man wants to roust someone, he wants to give that
someone the full treatment. This policeman will
make an arrest based up6n his false (but almost
impossible to disprove) claim that the suspect
matched the description given in a recently re-
ported crime. Then he will mug and book the
suspect and keep him in custody for as long as
possible. Granting the conscientious officer this
additional alternative will not increase the ex-
cesses of the officer who is already abusing the
powers of his office.
As a matter of fact, the existence of the third
alternative would help to more easily identify the
officer who is interested in harassment; his failing
to take advantage of the alternative offered to him
would result in his continuing to make full-blown,
baseless arrests.
In other words, the officer who would engage in
the abuse which many citizens fear does not need
the "stop and frisk" authorization to do so. He
can justify his activities under present law and
even support them with perjured testimony where
necessary. To grant the additional alternative, as
embraced in the "stop and frisk" concept, can only
help the conscientious officer to protect the com-
munity against criminal violence, and at the same
time result in benefits to honest, law-abiding
citizens who find themselves in circumstances
which attract police attention.
Justice Theodore Souris, of the Supreme Court
of Michigan, recently wrote an article appearing
in this Journal concerning the constitutional valid-
ity of "stop and frisk" practices.6 His position is
that any compulsory detention, in the absence of
probable cause to arrest, violates the fourth amend-
ment and renders inadmissible any evidence which
is the product of the detention. His arguments are
particularly directed to the first tentative draft of
the American Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-
Arraignment Procedure, but I take them to repre-
sent the thinking of those persons who oppose
giving police any authority to stop and question
persons on the street unless grounds exist for a
valid arrest. The AU draft proposal is summarized
by him as authorizing:
... an officer to stop persons in "suspicious
circumstances," and to detain them: for 20
minutes, during which time they may be
questioned and searched or, as defined by the
draftsmen's commentary accompanying the
proposal, frisked, for dangerous weapons.
The officer is further authorized to use rea-
sonable force, less than deadly, to obtain
these objectivesY
Criticism bf the draft proposal rests upon sev-
eral grounds, principally among which are the
following: (1) Compulsory detentions are not
indispensably needed for effective police activity;
(2) all detentions are arrests within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment; (3) Henry v. United States8
holds that since a detention is an arrest, probable
cause for an arrest is required in order to detain;
and (4) both arrests and detentions of persons
constitute seizures which must be based upon the
same standard of probable cause in order to be
reasonable.
Justice Souris' article is valuable as a point of
departure and indicates those opinions held by
6 Souris, Stop and Frisk or Arrest and Search-The
Use and Misuse of Euphemism, 57 J. CRIN. L., C. &
P.S. 251-264 (1966).
7 Id. at 253.
8 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
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persons of similar persuasion which pre-dispose
their rejection of the Am draft proposal or any
similar proposals. It is surely obvious that objec-
tions to the ALl draft proposal are equally (if not
more) applicable to California decisional law.
The approach of this article, then, is to express
my opinions concerning those fundamental prin-
ciples which pre-dispose me to accept California
decisional law and "stop and frisk" as sound.
An opponent of compulsory detentions can make
no more serious error than to assume that pro-
ponents of a specific proposal authorizing some
detentions are proponents of unfettered police
power. I am one of those who believe that there
should be constitutional and judicial restraints on
law enforcement. So the difference between the
opponents and myself does not involve that po-
sition. On the other hand, all reasonable people
must believe, as I do, that there are circumstances
when individual interests in liberty and privacy
must yield to the interests of society in the en-
forcement of criminal law.
I regret to say that Justice Souris, despite his
repeated appeals for dispassionate discussion,
evidences in his article grave doubts about whether
the proponents of "stop and frisk" proposals do
really value personal liberty or privacy vis-a-vis
law enforcement powers.
I certainly accept the intellectual and moral
integrity of those who disagree with my position
and submit that persons with equal integrity and
devotion to constitutional principles can con-
scientiously and earnestly support the concepts of
"stop and frisk" legislation. Indeed, the eminent
persons who comprise the President's Commission
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Jus-
tice recommend just such legislation. 9
In discussing the constitutional issues, I need do
no more than call attention to the two key pro-
visions of the fourth amendment, a prohibition
against "unreasonable searches and seizures"
and the requirement that warrants be based on
probable cause.
I agree with the Supreme Court's position in
Rabinowitz v. United States:1
It is unreasonable searches that are prohib-
ited by the Fourth Amendment.... It was
recognized by the framers of the Constitution
9 A Report by the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, THE CirAL-
LENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIETY 94-95 (1967).
10 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
1 339 U.S. at 60, 65.
that there were reasonable searches for which
no warrant was required.... The mandate of
the Fourth Amendment is that the People
shall be secure against unreasonable
searches."
Although no warrant may issue unless sup-
ported by probable cause, warrantless searches and
seizures are tested by their reasonableness, a test
which often encompasses the concept of probable
cause, but is not solely limited to that concept.
For purposes of this article, however, it is only
necessary to consider that aspect of reasonableness
which encompasses probable cause, since the key
to the right to stop and detain is probable cause to
stop and detain.
Justice Souris, relying upon Henry v. United
States, 2 concluded that a detention is unreasonable
unless there exists probable cause for an arrest.
This, then, is the crux of our difference. Is the de-
tention constitutionally unreasonable because
an arrest itself was not legally permissible, even
though a reasonable man would conclude (aside
from the question of constitutionality) that under
the circumstances known to the officer a mere de-
tention was warranted?
Suffice it to say, the result of the Henry case
could have been reached on a non-constitutional
basis. But beyond that, with stare decisis having of
late been reduced to a judicial relic, there is no
reason why the court could not find constitutional
reasonabreness in a well-drawn "stop and frisk"
statute, or for that matter in the well-written de-
cisions of the California courts. The fluid concept
of constitutional reasonableness is to some extent
indicated by Miranda v. Arizona.3 Although this
case may have created a plethora of problems out-
side the scope of this article, insofar as it consti-
tutionally draws distinctions between investigation
and interrogation, it offers hope for the constitu-
tionality of "stop and frisk."
In Miranda the Supreme Court of the United
States distinguished between the questioning of
a citizen for purposes of investigation which would
not require the admonitions imposed by that de-
cision and the questioning of a person during
-361 U.S. 98 (1959). Henry implicitly turned upon
the construction of "arrest" in 18 U.S.C. § 3052, which
provides the statutory basis for arrests by F.B.I. agents.
See Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1959) and
commentsjconcerning that case in Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23, 38-39 and 53 (1963), by Justices Clark and
Brennan, respectively. See also Rios v. United States,
364 U.S. 253, 261-262 (1960).
13 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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"custodial interrogation" which would require
such admonitions. 14 Thus the court clearly dis-
tinguishes between interrogation and investiga-
tion.
Interrogation is designed to obtain information
of an incriminatory nature which would implicate
a person in a crime that has already been com-
mitted, whereas investigation is designed to de-
termine what has occurred which may as a by-
product implicate someone in a crime but is not
designed nor undertaken for that purpose.
In short, the Court permits objectively gathering
facts but prohibits compelling incriminating state-
ments unless certain admonitions are given. Thus
the conduct of a police officer may be constitu-
tionally proper when engaged in for one purpose,
but not when the same type of conduct is engaged
in for a different purpose. Similarly, it is to be
hoped that probable cause for detention which
eventually leads to probable cause for an arrest
and a seizure may make that seizure constitu-
tionally permissible. if the initial stopping was
made for purposes of questioning, although such a
stopping would be constitutionally impermissible
if done for the purpose of an arrest. Miranda is an
example, therefore, of ,the Supreme Court inter-
preting the Constitution in a manner vhich takes
into account significant distinctions, i.e., between
investigation and interriogation. The distinction
between an informal deteiition and a formal arrest
should also be of ifiilar constitutiorial signifi-
cance.
I am not ready to concede that because Wolf v.
Coloiado'5 and Mapp v. Ohio6 have said that the
Fourth Amendment and its'enforcement by way of
the exclusionary rule is applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, previous
notions of due process have lost their vitality. I
believe that there is still room for the states to
adopt reasonable variations from federal standards
without doing violence to due process.
Indeed, this is .made quite explicit by the dis-
tinctions drawn in Ker v. CaliforniaY7 I believe the
following are accurate statements of the Court's
14 384 U.S. at 477-478.
2 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
16 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
17 374 U.S. 23, 31 (1963). The Court's opinion, written
by Justice Clark, had the concurrence of seven other
justices with reference to the standard by which state
searches and seizures must be evaluated. Separate opin-
ions applying that standard were written by Justices
Clark and Brennan, each of which was concurred in by
three other justices. Justice Harlan wrote a separate
opinion concurring in the result.
opinion: (1) Doctrines and standards interpretive
of the Fourth Amendment are equally applicable
to federal and state governments; (2) the Fourth
Amendment does not preclude the development
of state laws relating to arrests, searches, and
seizures which differ from federal laws, provided
that the constitutionality of state laws is deter-
mined by the standards imposed by the Fourth
Amendment; (3) principles of admissibility of ev-
idence in federal criminal trials which are derived
solely from the exercise of the Supreme Court's
supervisory authority over the administration of
criminal justice in federal courts and not interpre-
tive of the Constitution do not apply to the states.
And, as evidenced by the separate opinions of
Justices Clark and Brennan, eight of the justices
agree that when state law is not violative of the
Federal Constitution, the Court will look to state
law in gauging the validity of an arrest under the
Fourth Amendment. 8
More recently, I find encouragement in McCray
v. Illinois,9 wherein the Court upheld a state pro-
cedure which had a direct bearing upon the valid-
ity of a search and seizure. In McCray the Supreme
Court sustained the validity of a search and sei-
zure based upon information received by the police
from a reliable informant whose identity the
prosecution refused to disclose. The Court held
that the Constitution does not compel the states to
abolish the well-established informer's privilege,
long familiar to the law of evidence, in a situation
where the informer's information supplies the prob-
able cause upon which an arrest and search were.
made, where it was dear that the information, if
believed and relied upon, established the reason-
ableness of the arrest and search as required by
the Fourth Amendment.
When all is said and done, it will be the inter-
pretations of the justices which will resolve the
question, and not any particular language which
can be found in the Constitution itself.
In this context, the very practical considera-
tions which I have referred to in connection with
"stop and frisk" could and should be persuasive
in the "balancing" process. It does not follow in my
opinion that courts are constitutionally com-
manded to reject evidence taken in a search based
on probable cause to arrest just because the facts
establishing that probable cause were developed
18 See also Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261-
262 (1960), and cases cited therein.
19 - U.S. - , 87 Sup.Ct. 1056, 18 L.Ed. 2d 62
(1967).
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after an officer stopped a person and questioned
him under circumstances at first constituting only
probable cause to detain.
It appears to me that the applicability of the
"balancing test" in the construction of constitu-
tional provisions is a potential subject of misunder-
standing.
'We can all agree, at least arguendo, that what-
ever it is that a constitutional provision protects,
any governmental action which allegedly violated
the Constitution cannot be justified merely on the
ground that it is necessary or desirable for the
common good. The common good of the body
politic requires official conformity to constitu-
tional commands. This is, I think, a sufficient refu-
tation of the idea that it is proper for law enforce-
ment officers to ignore the Constitution in order to
enforce criminal law. Justice Souris contends,
however., that the balancing test may not licitly
be used in the construction of the Fourth Amend-
ment. This contention itself must rest upon the
principle that the balancing test may not be prop-
erly used in the construction of any constitutional
provision protecting a substantial right.
The balancing test has often been used in con-
stitutional interpretation, even where First Amend-
ment rights are involved. And its language-
"Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press" 20-is more absolute in
its tenor than the language of the Fourth Amend-
ment. Nevertheless, the Court has interpreted what
is meant by "freedom of speech" and "freedom of
the press." A balancing process has been used in
concluding that those terms do not include inten-
tional libel,21 intentional slander, obscenity22 or
falsely shouting "fire" in a crowded theater.
23
Is it any more unreasonable to say that a person
may not walk in a dark alley at 2 a.m. in a neigh-
borhood where there has been a number of bur-
glaries or robberies, without being willing to iden-
tify himself and briefly answer the patrolman's
questions concerning the purpose of the stroll.
To describe conduct as unreasonable is a value
judgment, not a statement of objective fact. It
is true that once a search is determined to be un-
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the
interests of law enforcement can never justify
violations of that guarantee. But, in judging
20 U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
2NN.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964);
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
2. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
whether particular types oi searches and seizures
are reasonable, surely the interest of society in
effective law enforcement must be weighed against
other interests (i.e., the interest of privacy and
liberty). Those rights protected by the Fourth
Amendment are, in my opinion, "discovered" only
by a balancing process entailing a comparative
evaluation of the respective weights of many
ostensibly conflicting values and interests. As such
evaluation requires complex analysis of many fac-
tors and circumstances, no simple test can be de-
fined to automatically resolve delicate or novel
constitutional issues. As the Supreme Court well
said in Rabinowitz '. United States:
4
What is a reasonable search is not to be de-
termined by any fixed formula. The Constitu-
tion does not define what are "unreasonable"
searches and, regrettably, in our discipline
we have no ready litmus-paper test. The
recurring questions of the reasonableness of
searches must find resolution in the facts and
circumstances of each case.
2 5
Thus, merely to show that a particular police
practice is or is not reasonably necessary is not
determinative of any constitutional issue arising
under the Fourth Amendment. On the other hand,
the value and necessity of a particular practice
can and should be a factor in the balancing process.
The applicability of the balancing test to the
Fourth Amendment cannot be summarily dis-
missed in view of the very qualified language of
that provision.
In arguing against the ALl draft proposal, Jus-
tice Souris protests that:
There can be no doubt who would bear the
brunt of this new power, it would be those
members of our cities' minority groups-
those citizens who frequently are excoriated
for holding in contempt the processes of a
legal system which traditionally has treated
them with contempt if not outright abuse.2 '
If authority to "stop and frisk" is judicially
limited to its reasonable exercise, abuses of such
authority are not legalized. It is the absence of
rules authorizing reasonable "stop and frisk"
practices which increases the likelihood of abuse of
power. That is why members of minority groups
who are really knowledgeable concerning police
practices support the "stop and frisk" concept.
2.339 U.S. 56.
25 339 U.S. at 63.
2 Souris, supra note 6, at 256.
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If a stop and frisk procedure is judged unreason-
able because it may be abused, there is no police
procedure which should not be judged unreasonable
upon the same ground. In evaluating the "rea-
sonableness" of a police procedure, the nature and
magnitude as well as the potential frequency of
abuses of the power in question must be weighed,
together with all other relevant factors.
Moreover, members of minority groups have a
right to be free from criminal activity as well as
from police misconduct. If a police procedure is
dangerous because it presents a danger to polit-
ical liberty, it is likewise true that absence of
reasonable police power presents a danger of law-
lessness..
Many objections to -stop and frisk" pro-
posals are. grounded onf the claim that judicial
restraints already imposed have been attended with
progressively good results. Therefore, it is either
said or implied, further limitations on police powers
will be attended with similarly good results. This
exemplifies what is known, as the fallacy of ex-
trapolation. The mere fact that changes in a cer-
tain direction have been usually attended with
good results does not mean that further changes
will never reach a point when the bad results
outweigh the good results.
Is it possible that the invasion of liberty or
privacy involved by a temporary detention and,
if warranted, frisking of a motorist or pedestrian
can be reasonable if the standard is less than
probable cause to arrest? Some standard is nec-
essary in order to minimize abuse or harassment.
On the other hand, to require the standard of
probable cause to arrest may defeat the purposes
of detention.
The purpose of a detention is to question a
person when an officer has "reasonable cause to
investigate" whether a crime has been committed
or will soon be c6mmitted. Police have a clear
responsibility to prevent ciime as well as to ap-
prehend violators. They serve a deterrent purpose
fully as important as their responsibilify to ferret
out criminals. Surely citizens expect the police to
investigate suspicious circumstances in their
neighborhood that may fall short of probable
cause to arrest. Children are entitled to the law's
protection against idlers. loafers, and vagrants who
lurk about the schoolhouse and public toilets.
May police not question an elderly man who
wanders through a public park offering children
candy and urging them to come visit him? Are
people free to prowl through a wholesale warehouse
district on a hot summer night attired in sneakers
and gloves without interference? When a car is
found parked in an alley behind a dosed business
establishment during early morning hours, the
more reasonable hypothesis in some circumstances
is not that those in the car have committed a
burglary, but that they are going to commit a
burglary. The mere fact that such a car is stopped,
the occupants identified, questioned, and detained
while a check is made as to whether a burglary
has taken place, will have a deterrent effect. Yet
it may be that stopping the vehicle and'questioning
the occupants will reveal that their presence in the
alley is with an innocent purpose.
The Supreme Court's language in Hoffa v.
United Statesn is of interest even though the
Court was dealing with a completely different fact
situation:
The police are not required to guess at their
peril the precise moment at which they have
probable cause to arrest a suspect, risking a
violation of the Fourth Amendment if they
act too soon, and a violation of the Sixth
.Amendment if they wait too long.2
In explaining the rule of temporary detention,
the California Supreme Court expressed its be-
lief that:
It strikes a balance between a person's in-
terest in immunity from police interference
and the community's interest in law enforce-
ment. It wards off pressure to equate reason-
abie cause to investigate with reasonable cause
to arrest, thus protecting- the innocent from
the risk of arrest when no more than reason-
able investigation is justified.2'
When we discuss "reasonable cause to inves-
tigate," we are "spbaking of circumstances that
justify an officer's inference that a crime has been
or shortly will be committed which is substan-
tially more probable than any one of the possible
explanations of the circumstances consistent with
innocence. As indicated above by the holdup-
murder case example, the authority to detain
based upon a standard of reasonable cause to in-
vestigate serves to protect the innocent against the
risk of having an unnecessary arrest record. If
there is no authority to reasonably detain an un-
cooperative suspect, the officer is faced with the
27 385 U.S. 293.
I 385 U.S. at 310.
29 People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal.2d at 452, 380 P.2d at
660.
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limited choice of either releasing or arresting the
person who blandly announces he will not remain
voluntarily. It is, in my opinion, unrealistic to
suppose that an officer will not "stretch"-albeit,
in good faith-to find probable cause to arrest a
person whose conduct warrants further investi-
gation and whose departure would frustrate the
investigation.
Those who oppose any compulsory detention
based upon a standard of less than probable cause
argue that detention does involve interference with
the liberty of the person detained. He is interrupt-
ed in his liberty of movement. He is inconvenienced,
because detention takes time. He may well be em-
barrassed if he is frisked for weapons. His feeling
of dignity is offended by the detention and, per-
haps, frisking. Such interference with his liberty
and privacy, it is said, is so substantial as to re-
quire the standard of probable cause to arrest.
Such an argument discloses that tbe critic has
failed to distinguish among various types of
searches and seizures. Such failure to differentiate
among the varying degrees, kinds and character-
istics of searches and seizures must inevitably lead
to an automatic condemnation of compulsory
detention.
Yet even the most zealous opponent of "stop
and frisk" proposals must agree that detention of
a motorist or pedestrian for a short period of time
and (if warranted) a frisk for weapons constitutes
much less of an invasion of liberty and privacy than
is involved in forcibly taking a suspect to a police
station, searching through his clothing, or opening
the trunk of his vehicle.
A power to stop and question motorists and
pedestrians would be unreasonable if it were abso-
lute. But such power is not advocated. The power
is only advocated when the officer has reasonable
cause to investigate whether a crime has been, is,
or will soon be committed.
Finally, those of us who seek to justify the posi-
tion that some "stop and frisk" procedures are
reasonable do so on the ground that such reason-
ableness is countenanced by standards provided
by the Fourth Amendment. Because the due proc-
ess of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
operates to apply the Fourth Amendment to the
states, the standards of reasonableness in judging
the constitutionality of state "stop and frisk"
rules are to be found in the Fourth Amendment
and in those notions of fundamental fairness char-
acterized as due process. Among a number of fac-
tors to be weighed in deciding the reasonableness
and fundamental fairness of compulsory detention
is the fact that some reasonable and responsible
citizens do approve of it. Thus, the California
Supreme Court,30 as well as the appellate courts"
or legislatures32 of several sister states, find compul-
sory detention reasonable and consistent with the
Fourth Amendment and the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The ALl draftsmen of
the tentative model proposal and the President's
Commission of Law Enforcement and Administra-
tion of Justice have recommended statutes, with
adequate safeguards, authorizing "stop and frisk"
practices. Certainly the opponents of all "stop and
frisk" rules cannot dismiss the opinions of- such
groups for the same reasons they assert in rejecting
similar proposals when advanced by law enforce-
ment agencies. The general consensus of the public
is also a factor to be considered in what is funda-
mentally fair.
We hire police to protect us against burglars,
robbers and the like. It is a job we cannot do for
ourselves. We all know that there are persons
against whom we need that protection.
I can understand why a criminal would not want
to be stopped and questioned. But I find it hard
to understand the thinking of an honest, law-
abiding citizen who resents being stopped or ques-
tioned under circumstances which clearly indicate
that a policeman is trying to do the very job that
the general public expects and, in fact, demands
of him. For my own part, I sleep more soundly at
night when I know that there is a patrol unit in the
neighborhood which will investigate strangers in
the area under suspicious circumstances.
APPENDIX
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S MODEL
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-
SEcTION, 2.02
Section 2.02. Stopping of Persons.
(1) Stopping of Persons Having Knowledge of
Crime. A law enforcement officer lawfully present
30 It is noteworthy that in California, a highly indus-
trialized, urbanized and populated state, the state su-
preme court accepted the concept of "stop and frisk"
while at the same time demonstrating, prior to Mapl
v. Ohio, supra, note 16, a sensitive concern for individ-
ual rights in the area of search and seizure. See People
v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
11 For example, State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App.2d 122,
214 N.E. 2d 114 (1966); Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220
(Alaska 1964).
2 For example, 11 DEL. CODE, ch. 19, §§ 1902, 1903
(1953); N.H. REV. STAT., ch. 594, §§ 594:2, 594:3
(1955); N.Y. CODE OF CRIM. PRoC., ch. 86, § 180-a
(1964); R.I. GE.. LAWS, ch. 7, §§ 12-7-1, 12-7-2 (1956).
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in any place may, if he has reasonable cause to
believe that a felony or misdemeanor has been
committed and that any person has knowledge
which may be of material aid to the investigation
thereof, order such person to remain in or near
such place in the officer's presence for a period of
not more than twenty minutes.
(2) Stopping of Persons in Suspicious Circum-
stances. A law enforcetnent officer lawfully present
in any place may, if a person is observed in circum-
stances which suggest that he has committed or is
about to commit a felony or misdemeanor, and
such action is reasonably necessary to enable the
officer to determine the lawfulness of that person's
conduct, order that person to remain in or near
such place in the officer's presence for a period
not more than twenty minutes.
(3) Action to Be Taken During Period of Stop.
A law enforcement officer may require a person to
remain in his presence pursuant to subsection (1)
or (2) of this section only insofar as such action is
reasonably necessary to
(a) obtain the identification of such person;
(b) verify by readily available information an
identification of such person;
(c) request cooperatiori pursuant to and subject
to the limitations of Section 2.01; or
(d) verify by readily available" information any
account of his presence or conduct or other infor-
mation given by such person.
(4) Use of Force. In order to exercise me aunor-
ity conferred in subsections (1) and (2) of this
section, a law enforcement officer may use such
force, other than deadly force, as is reasonably
necessary to stop any person or vehicle or to cause
any person to remain in'the officer's presence.
(5) Search for Dangerous Weapons. A law
enforcement officer -Mfo has stopped or ordered any
person to remain in his presence pursuant to this
section may, if he reasonably believes that his
safety so requires, search such person and his
immediate surroundings, but only -to the extent
necessary to discover any dangerous weapons
which may on that occasion be used against the
officer.
(6) Action to Be Taken After Period of Stop.
Unless an officer acting hereunder arrests a person
during the time he is authorized by subsections (1)
and (2) of this section to require such person to
remain in his presence, he shall, at the end of such
time, inform such person that he is free to go.
(7) Records Relating to Persons Stopped. A law
enforcement officer, who has ordered any person
to remain in his presence pursuant to this section,
shall with reasonable promptness thereafter pre-
pare and sign a report setting forth the name and
address of such person; the place, time and purpose
of the stop; the names of additional officers and
other persons present; whether the person stopped
objected thereto; whether force was used and, if
so, the 'degree and circumstances thereof; and
whether the person stopped was searched and, if
so, a description of all items seized and their
disposition.
(8) Limitations to Prevent Abuse. The authority
to stop persons granted in subsections (1) and (2)
of this section may not be used solely to aid in the
investigation or prevention of the following crimes:
(a) any misdemeanor the maximum penalty for
which doe s not include a sentence of imprisonment
of more than-thirty days;
(b) loitering;
(c) vagrancy;
* (d) ... [Note: There should be added to this
list those felonies and misdemeanors, in connection
with which the stop authority is unnecessary, or
creates an- undue risk of abuse or harassment, such
as ordinances requiring permits for public parades
or gatherings.]
NOTE ON SECTION 2.02
This section authorizes a brief period of on-the-
spot detention of -suspects and witnesses, and the
use of non-deadly force to effect such detention,
where there is reasonable cause to believe that a
felony or misdemeanor has been committed. It also
authorizes such detention of persons found in sus-
picious circumstances. The officer may not take
the. detained person from the place where he is
found. This detention is authorized only if it is
necessary to accomplish the law enforcement pur-
poses specified in subsection (3), and only for the
period necessary to accomplish them. In no case
.may the detention exceed twenty minutes. The
purp5oses specified in subsection (3) are: obtaining
and verifying the identification of a person who
might otherwise become unavailable, requesting
such person to cooperate, and verifying informa-
tion given by such person. The express limitation
of the authority to cases where it is necessary for
these purposes is intended to prevent the use of
the authority for purposes of harassment. Subsec-
tion (3) (c) makes clear that there is no authority
to compel cooperation. Cooperation may only be
sought pursuant to Section 2.01, with its attendant
safeguards. At the expiration of the twenty min-
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utes, the officer must inform the detained person
that he is free to go.
In response to concerns expressed by members
of the Advisory Committee, the Reporters have
sought to be as precise and restrictive in stating
the ground for the exercise of this authority as is
consistent with the purposes to be served. The
authority in subsection (1), which applies to any
person-witness or suspect-may only be exercised
if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that,
a felony or misdemeanor has been committed and
that the person stopped has significant knowledge
thereof. Subsection (2), which applies only to cases
where a person is observed in circumstances which
suggest his involvement in the commission of a
crime, refers to the situation in which the need for
the inquiry arises precisely because the officer sus-
pects but does not have reasonable cause to believe
that such a crime has been committed. It is, how-
ever, limited to situations where a brief on-the-
spot detention is necessary to prevent the disap-
pearance of the suspect. And, by the applicability
of Section 2.01, an officer is forbidden falsely to
imply an obligation to cooperate with him, and
pursuant to Section 2.01 (2), where the officer
engages in sustained questioning, he must warn
such person that there is no obligation to respond.
The authority to detain briefly on less than the
reasonable cause justifying an arrest is granted
because there are situations in which an officer may
thereby determine whether he should arrest a per-
son, possibly a dangerous offender, who might
otherwise disappear. As applied to witnesses, this
authorization is intended to meet the need in an
emergency (e.g., after a shooting in the presence
of a number of persons) to "freeze" the situation
while the officer makes his initial evaluation and
obtains the names and addresses of possible wit-
nesses. Further, in the confused circumstances
often following a crime of violence, it may not be
possible to tell at once whether a particular person
at or near the scene is a suspect or a witness. The
grant of such an authority, both less drastic than
an arrest and justified on a lesser probability of
guilt, should also serve to forestall a too ready and
oppressive recourse to formal arrest.
The authorization of a lesser restriction on
liberty than an arrest and therefore a restriction
more easily justified, has precedent in legislation
such as the New York "Stop and Frisk" law and
Uniform Arrest Act. This section goes beyond these
provisions in its application to witnesses as well as
suspects, but is otherwise more precisely delimited
and explicit in setting out the circumstances to
which it applies and providing safeguards during
the period of detention.
In jurisdictions having no statutory grants of
power to stop in the absence of probable cause, the
decisions are divided on the validity of such a
power; but no court has invalidated a statutory
grant of such an authority. The United States
Supreme Court has not spoken definitively on the
subject.
Detention under this section is not called an
arrest, since in the draft "arrest" is used in the
conventional sense to authorize the far more oner-
ous interference of removal to a police station and
eventually to court. But, inasmuch as this section
authorizes a "seizure" of the person, it must be
reasonable if it is to satisfy the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment. The precedents in existing
law for such a provision and the safeguards by
which it is accompanied in this Code lead the
Reporters to believe that this provision does not
authorize an unreasonable seizure of the person,
and thus does not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Subsection (5) authorizes a limited search of the
person and immediate surroundings of the person
detained, because an authorization to detain with-
out an authority to conduct such a limited search
would expose the officer to an unjustifiable risk of
attack by persons armed with concealed weapons.
The question of the admissibility of any evidence
discovered on such a search will be considered in
connection with the drafting of the search and
seizure provisions.
Subsection (8) is designed to minimize the possi-
bility that a police officer may use this section to
justify harassment or abuse. By this subsection
the authority is made inapplicable to minor
offenses, and to offenses such as loitering and va-
grancy. The section should also be made inappli-
cable to offenses such as parading without a permit,
where this authority would serve no serious law
enforcement function and would present a risk of
harassment or abuse.
It is also contemplated that when the penalty
provisions of the Code are drafted, severe penalties
will be imposed in cases where the stop authority
is used for purposes of harassment.
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